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The impacts of inward FDI on host countries are frequently studied using balance-of-payments based
measures of flows and stocks.  These are unreliable for the purpose because, while theories of the effects
of investment are based on FDI production and employment in the host country, these measures are
often distorted approximations of the location of real activity.  The mismeasurement  is particularly
important if trade openness, often associated with FDI, is treated as a control variable. 
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a very minor object of US direct investment, have, since 
1990, become a major location for FDI from Europe, especially from Germany. The investments from 
both the US and Germany are, on average, very labor-intensive, and are heavily concentrated in Motor 
Vehicles. One result has been a shift in the export comparative advantage of these countries toward the 
machinery and transport equipment sector. 
 
Microdata studies in the CEE countries have found that foreign participation is associated with higher
productivity in the affiliates themselves.  Spillovers to indigenous firms are more spotty, clearer to
upstream suppliers than to firms in the same industries as the affiliates.
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  In one sense the issue of the desirability of inward FDI for host countries seems to have 
been decided.  Policy making has come to ignore the ambiguous and inconclusive academic 
literature and, in most countries, has shifted away from measures restricting and discouraging 
inward FDI.  Many countries have not only reduced or eliminated such restrictions, but also 
moved toward encouraging FDI with tax and other incentives.   UNCTAD’s compilations of 
regulatory changes by host countries since 1991 show that they have  been overwhelmingly 
favorable to inward FDI, although recent years have seen more unfavorable changes, up to 20  
percent in 2005, the highest share in the compilation.  The unfavorable changes were 
concentrated in extractive industries and in Latin America (UNCTAD, 2006, pp. 24-25).  
 Something must have happened to influence so many countries’ policies.  I think I know 
what that something is.  It is the success that a few countries have apparently had in achieving 
rapid economic growth after moving from virtual prohibition of direct investment to active 
encouragement of it.  Ireland and China are two notable and conspicuous examples of countries 
that reversed a long standing antipathy toward foreign investors and have achieved rapid growth 
in which foreign-owned firms have played a very large part. 
An aspect of the role of FDI that I think is almost beyond dispute is that much of the 
world’s stock of technological knowledge is possessed by multinational firms.  That can be seen 
partly in the fact that labor is so much more productive in these firms than outside them; 
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multinationals probably produce more than 10 percent of the world’s output, but employ only 1 
or at most 2 percent of the world’s labor.  Whenever comparisons are made within countries, it 
appears that not only are foreign multinationals more productive than domestic firms in general, 
as measured by labor productivity or TFP, but among domestically-owned firms, those that are 
multinational are more efficient than non-multinational firms, even within the same industries 
and taking account of other factors affecting efficiency.  
  What is it that we want to know about the impacts of FDI?  Quite often the issue is put in 
the context of the use of subsidies or other incentives specific to foreign-owned firms and the 
question posed is whether these subsidies are worth while.  I think that that is the wrong context, 
and distorts the issue.  The most important measures favorable to inward FDI in my view, are to 
remove prohibitions against it, to remove other measures that discriminate against foreign firms, 
to reduce or remove impediments to trade and open markets, and to improve governance. 
  One of the main technological advantages of foreign-owned firms is their knowledge of 
international markets and the ability to judge and compare the costs of different locations for 
production,  particularly locations for  fragments in long lines of production that extend across 
several countries.  Subsidies and other preferential arrangements can distort the choices of 
locations, leaving uneconomic white elephants after the preferential arrangements end.   In some 
of the most successful cases of growth through exploiting foreign investment, the foreign firms 
have been able to look past host countries’ current comparative advantages in exporting and to 
see potential comparative advantages that exploit the combination of the host country’s resources 
with the technology and other knowledge of the foreign firms.  
 Many studies have asked whether attracting foreign firms will make a recipient country 
grow faster than it would without foreign investment or with only portfolio investment.  Another   3 
economy-wide question that used to absorb a lot of attention was the long-run effect of inward 
FDI on the host country’s balance of payments, but that is a topic that I rarely see mentioned 
now.  We seem to have decided that there are other factors that determine a country’s balance of 
payments surpluses or deficits over long periods. 
There is little reason to expect that the effects of inward investment should be the same 
for all host countries.   A country with a long history of forbidding or discouraging inward 
investment, that then opens up to it, may have an industrial structure with large gaps in newer or 
more technologically advanced industries that investors can fill, while a country that has been 
open to investment may present a much more competitive milieu.  A country that is open to trade 
may attract elements of firms’ worldwide production that are combined with those in other 
countries before becoming final products, while a country that restricts trade or hinders it by 
inefficiency or corruption may not attract such investment.  More generally, countries that 
provide reliable and predictable legal systems and efficient public administration may receive 
more investment and profit more from it than countries with poor governance. 
FDI flows very unevenly to the various sectors of an economy.   As more disaggregated 
data became available, one could ask about the effects of FDI inflows on particular industrial 
sectors or regions, particularly the industries or regions receiving the investment, but also others 
that buy from or sell to those sectors.  These questions have not usually been studied with 
balance of payments data, because their sectoral detail is poor in most countries and often is not 
closely related to the sectoral breakdown of employment, sales, physical capital stock, or 
production.  Instead, these questions have been studied using data from production censuses in 
recipient countries, often confined to the manufacturing sector, or manufacturing and mining.   4 
Not only are sectors affected differently, but not every firm within a sector is likely to be 
affected in the same way by the entrance or expansion of foreign-owned firms.  The firms with 
the most up-to-date technologies may respond differently from those that were laggards.  Large 
firms may fare differently from small firms.  Exporting firms may respond differently from 
completely domestic firms.  All these questions require a different kind of data for research.  The 
questions can be reliably answered only with the use of firm or establishment microdata, in 
which individual firms’ attributes can be related to their subsequent performance.   With these 
individual firm data, we can now  sometimes ask what happens to a particular domestically-
owned firm that becomes foreign-owned or to a foreign-owned firm that becomes domestically-
owned, and to other firms in the same industry or location.   
The latest development, still at an early stage, is that we are beginning to get data on 
individual workers within the individual firms.  With such data we can begin to see what 
happens to workers of different types, different skills, experience, and education, when their 
employers become foreign-owned, or cease to be so. 
 
Impacts of Inward FDI on Host Country Growth 
  There have been many attempts over the years to test whether any general relationship 
could be found between inflows of FDI to a host country and host country economic growth.  
The only data on such inflows, or the resulting stocks of direct investment capital, covering 
many countries and long periods, are those based on financial flows, as recorded in balances of 
payments and national accounts.   
In contrast, most theories about how FDI might accelerate growth in a host country rely 
on the effects of foreign-owned production taking place there.  Production by foreign   5 
multinationals might raise the level of competition in the host economy, bring superior 
technology that could be used by the foreign-owned producer or imitated by domestic firms, 
train host country workers in more efficient production methods, which they would use in 
working for the foreign firm or carry with them to other firms, etc.  I don’t want to catalogue all 
the possible channels of transmission, but to emphasize that they depend on a foreign presence 
that involves production in the host country. 
  Data on such FDI exist for only a few countries, mostly for short periods.  Where they do 
exist, such as for the United States, we can compare them with the FDI flow and stock data.  Are 
the balance of payments and national accounts data good indicators of the extent of FDI 
production, capital stock, or employment in a country?   The short answer is that they are very 
rough, but not wholly inaccurate, measures of the country distribution of FDI production, 
employment, and fixed capital at any one time, but very poor measures of changes over time.  
Thus, when we use the balance of payments measures to proxy for FDI production or 
employment changes, we are observing the latter through a thick fog.   A couple of examples 
make the point.  Hong Kong is the largest outward investor among developing countries, but half 
of Hong Kong’s stock of outward FDI was in four tax havens, the British Virgin Islands, 
Bermuda, Panama, and the Cayman Islands, according to UNCTAD (2004, p.  26).   I think we 
can be sure that the productive activity involved, if there was any, was not in those locations.  
Luxembourg was reported to be the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 2002, accounting for 19 
percent of all the world’s inflows  “…because it offers favorable conditions for holding 
companies and for corporate HQ, such as certain tax exemptions”  (UNCTAD 2003, p. 69).  We 
can be sure that if any production was being financed, it did not take place in Luxembourg.  The 
BEA reported (Koncz and Yorgason, 2005, p. 45) that the share of holding companies in the U.S.   6 
investment position abroad reached more than a third in 2004, concealing both the location and 
the industry composition of any associated production. 
A recent and sophisticated analysis of this type of data by Carkovic and Levine (2005) 
concluded that “…the exogenous component of FDI does not exert a robust, positive influence 
on economic growth”  and  that “…there is no reliable cross-country empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that FDI per se accelerates economic growth”  (p. 197).  The negative 
conclusion is expressed cautiously:  “…after controlling for the joint determination of growth 
and foreign capital flows, country-specific factors and other growth determinants, the data do not 
suggest a strong, independent impact of FDI on economic growth” (p. 198).  The policy 
indications drawn are that the study’s analyses “do not support special tax breaks and subsidies 
to attract foreign capital…sound policies encourage economic growth and also provide an 
attractive environment for foreign investment” (p. 198).     Finally, “…the results are inconsistent 
with the view that FDI exerts a positive impact on growth that is independent of other growth 
determinants” (p. 219). 
In his comments on these results,  Melitz (2005) challenged part of the interpretation, 
pointing out that the results that do not include controls for trade openness, but do control for 
many other country characteristics, show a positive relation of FDI to growth.  Melitz noted that 
vertical FDI implies trade, and that both are determined by country policy toward trade and 
investment.  In that case, controlling for trade openness wipes out the relationship between the 
combination of trade and investment and economic growth.      
A different interpretation of the role of trade openness is that the combination of FDI 
with trade tends to distinguish what I am tempted to call “genuine” FDI stocks, that is, FDI 
stocks associated with production, from financial FDI stocks that have no production attached to   7 
them.  The connection between the benefits from inward FDI and the trade policy of the host 
country echoes an earlier suggestion by Bhagwati (1978), confirmed to some extent by 
Balasubramanayan, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996), that growth effects of FDI could be positive or 
negative, with negative effects associated with import-substitution policies.  Carkovic and 
Levine do use an interaction term between openness to trade and FDI in some formulations and 
report that it is significant in some panel regressions but not in others, a result that they report as 
a finding that the connection is “not robust” (p. 211).  
One lesson that Carkovic and Levine draw from their study is that the results “…do not 
support special tax breaks and subsidies to attract foreign capital” (p. 198).  In one sense this 
conclusion does not clash with the comment by Melitz.  Inward FDI attracted by an open trade 
regime may conform to existing or potential comparative advantages in trade, but FDI attracted 
by tax breaks or subsidies, especially if protection is part of the incentives, may be more likely to 
fit badly with the host country’s comparative advantages and may be less likely to be associated 
with enlarged trade.  Moran’s (2005) paper in the same volume gives many examples of such ill-
fitting foreign investments. 
A recent strand in these multicountry studies has been to suggest that well developed 
financial markets in host countries are the key to host country productivity benefits.  Some of 
this literature and empirical studies along the same lines, mostly pointing to productivity gains in 
upstream industries, are discussed in Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2006). 
All of these analyses assume that the balance of payments data on FDI really do measure 
the amount of foreign-owned production in a host country.  In fact, they do not, for many 
reasons.  Even if they are correctly measured, by the principles laid down by the IMF (1993), and 
many countries’ reports do not, the data do not measure either output or input in the host country.    8 
For one thing, the reported country of location of FDI  represents only the first stop on what may 
be a long trek from the originating country to the location where production takes place, a stop 
determined by tax or other financial considerations rather than suitability as a production 
location.  Furthermore, since a large part of the exported FDI capital may by intangible, or 
intellectual, capital, it has no discernable geographical location.  Its only real location is its 
ownership within the multinational firm.   The parent firm can choose a nominal geographical 
location, usually for tax minimization, but use the asset in production anywhere in the world. 
In view of the ambiguity in the meaning of the location of financial flows and stocks of 
FDI, a better summary of the results of analyzing these data might be that the conventional 
measures of flows and stocks of FDI do not appear to unambiguously determine or affect host 
country economic growth, but that the combination of FDI and open trade policy serves to 
distinguish those flows or stocks of FDI that are associated with production in a country from 
those that are just passing through or represent an internal allocation of intangible property to 
that country without any link to local  production.  These flows or stocks, or these combined with 
open trade policy, do seem to promote host country growth.  I might note also that even the 
studies that take a skeptical view of this relationship rarely find a negative effect of FDI. 
One study of FDI inflows and aggregate economic growth based on balance-of-payments 
FDI data was confined to the CEE countries and those of the former Soviet Union.  That scope 
was justified by the argument that the backwardness of these countries meant that the FDI there 
represented more of a pure case of technology transfer than FDI elsewhere (Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2002).  The conclusion in that case was that for these countries, the relationship was 
“…positive, significant, and robust” (p. 417).    9 
Given the defects of the balance of payments data, and the lack of a clear connection with 
FDI production, my conclusion is that, for large groups of countries, they are a dead end for 
research on the effects of FDI and are not worth further pursuit or efforts at refinement.   Aside 
from the deficiencies of the data I have described, my suspicion is that, despite the efforts of the 
IMF to push for uniform standards of reporting, the FDI data are deteriorating, rather than 
improving, because they are dependent on firms’ bookkeeping, and firms are becoming more 
adept at manipulating the bookkeeping for tax minimization purposes.  
 If we accept the idea that little can be learned from studies in which FDI is represented 
by balance of payments flows and stocks, we are led to studies that measure FDI by production, 
sales, labor input, or capital input.  These variables are available for much smaller groups of 
countries, but they have the advantage that they can be subdivided by industry.  In some cases, 
they can be subdivided also into individual firms or establishments, or into groupings of firms 
based on their individual characteristics.  I review here a few of these industry and firm studies 
concentrating on Central and Eastern European countries in the EU or about to enter.  These are 
all cases where the individual countries have had the common experience of moving from 
economies based on central planning, with little foreign involvement and little trade, to various 
degrees of private enterprise, encouragement of inward investment, and more open trade.     
 
The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe as Locations for FDI 
  The countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are very recent arrivals in the FDI 
landscape. They are, along with China and Ireland, interesting laboratories in which to observe 
the impact of inward FDI. For the most part, they had not been recipients of FDI to any 
important degree before 1990 (the conversion of Ireland to welcoming FDI had come much   10 
earlier).  In 1990, the CEE countries were far below the average country with respect to inward 
FDI stocks, considering their size.  For example, if we fit a log equation explaining the reported 
inward FDI stock across about 150 countries in 1990 by real (purchasing power adjusted) gross 
output, it explains about 60 percent of the variance across countries.   Most of the CEE countries 
did not report any inward FDI at all, and the ones that did, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland, reported stocks that were 40 percent of the predicted value (Czechoslovakia) or  much 
less.   
After 1990, the CEE countries lowered the barriers to FDI to varying degrees.  Of course, 
many other developments were taking place at the same time: increasing openness to trade, 
privatization of previously government-owned production, and many other changes as these 
countries moved in various degrees from socialist to market economies and democratic 
governments.  By 2003, the last year for which we have a full set of countries reporting inward 
FDI stocks, a similar log equation explained about two thirds of the variance in inward FDI 
stocks, and all of the CEE countries reported some amounts.  The equation predicted inward FDI 
levels far higher than those predicted for 1990, four to six times as high, but by that time the 
inward stocks in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic far 
surpassed the predicted levels (Table 1). FDI in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia was 
close to the predicted values and only FDI in Bulgaria was well below, as was FDI in China, 
despite the huge flows to that country.    11 
 
Table 1: Inward FDI Stocks and Stocks Predicted From Country Real 
Gross Product, CEE Countries and China, 2003 [Millions of USD]                                             
(Log FDI Stock)=-1.7487+0.9505×(Log RGDP)
a 
Country  Actual FDI Stock  Predicted FDI Stock 
China  228,371  546,708 
     
Bulgaria  5,082  6,848 
Czech Republic  45,287  16,127 
Estonia  6,511  2,140 
Hungary  48,320  13,973 
Latvia  3,282  2,892 
Lithuania  4,960  4,453 
Poland  55,268  34,729 
Romania  12,815  14,193 
Slovak Republic  11,864  6,285 
Slovenia  4,446  4,319 
 
Note: 
a). Adj. R-squared = 0.6694; Prob. F = 0.0000; No. of obs. = 154 
 
Source: 
Penn World Table 6.2 by Heston, Summers and Aten (Sept. 2006). 
UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (downloaded on Nov. 3rd, 2006). 
 
  Many studies of the location of FDI now include measures of governance or other 
institutional quality that are not readily quantifiable but seem to influence corporate decisions.  
The World Bank has been issuing governance indicators covering almost a decade now, and 
these provide some picture of the changes taking place in the CEE countries in this respect.   
  A striking change for the CEE countries has been the improvement in all their measures 
of governance since the first ones in 1996.   For the six governance measures calculated by the 
World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and  Mastruzzi, 2006), the average score for the CEE countries 
in 1996 was only 22 percent of the average of the 15 pre-1995 EU members (Table 2).  By 2005, 
the ratio had reached 48 percent.  Some of the CEE countries scored higher than Italy or Greece 
in 2005, but only the Czech Republic had scored higher than both of them in 1996.  The 
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Table 2: World Bank Average of Governance Ratings, 1996 and 2003, 
and Global Competitiveness Rankings, 2005 
Governance 
Scores    Global Competitiveness 
Rankings  Country 
1996  2003     2005 
China  -0.33  -0.50    48 
EU-15  1.44  1.42    18 
Spain  1.03  1.17    28 
Portugal  1.21  1.25    31 
Italy  0.74  0.83    38 
Greece  0.64  0.79    47 
         
CEE Countries  0.32  0.67    40 
Bulgaria  -0.25  0.20    61 
Czech Republic  0.77  0.78    29 
Estonia  0.58  1.01    26 
Hungary  0.62  0.89    35 
Latvia  0.11  0.76    39 
Lithuania  0.16  0.81    34 
Poland  0.52  0.63    43 
Romania  -0.29  -0.04    67 
Slovak Republic  0.28  0.67    36 
Slovenia  0.74  1.00     30 
           
           Source: 
           Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). 
           World Economic Forum (2006). 
 
improvement in governance may have helped to attract inflows of FDI, but it could also be that 
the hope of attracting FDI led to the improvements in governance.   
    Another rating of the economic environment in each country is provided by the overall 
competitiveness rankings of the Global Competitiveness Reports (World Economic Forum, 
2006).  For 2006, the average ranking of the CEE countries was 43, where 1 represented the 
highest rank.  The average among the EU-15 was 19.  Estonia, followed by the Czech Republic, 
followed by Slovenia, were the leaders among the CEE countries, not far behind the EU average, 
but some of the CEE countries ranked much lower.  In this ranking, the more attractive CEE 
countries outranked both Greece and Italy, and were close to Portugal and Spain.   13 
  Most of the progress in the governance ratings for CEE countries since 1996 took place 
between 1996 and 2003.  Since then, the average has been roughly constant, even slipping back a 
little.  It may be no coincidence that these countries applied for EU membership between 1994 
and 1996 and most of them entered the EU in 2004.  The improvement in governance, intended 
to facilitate or permit EU entry, may have had the secondary effect of encouraging inward FDI.  
That reflects a persistent problem of analysis; the effects of joining the EU or of receiving inward 
FDI are mixed with the effects of actions aimed at achieving EU membership or encouraging 
inward investment. 
  If we add the World Bank governance scores (in arithmetic form, since they can be 
negative) to the prediction of the level of inward FDI, the percent of variance in FDI levels 
explained rises from 67 to 77 percent, and the predicted values for most countries listed are 
higher (Table 3), a little closer to the actual values, but still below them, except in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, four of the smallest countries.  That discrepancy points to non-
linearity in the relation of inward investment to host country GDP.  
Table 3: Equation Predicting Inward FDI Stock From Host Country 
Real Output and Governance, 2003 [Millions of USD]                                             
(Log FDI Stock)=-0.6311+0.8399×(Log RGDP)+0.9681×Governance
a 
Country  Actual FDI Stock  Predicted FDI Stock 
China  228,371  180,979 
     
Bulgaria  5,082  7,437 
Czech Republic  45,287  27,830 
Estonia  6,511  5,797 
Hungary  48,320  27,158 
Latvia  3,282  5,973 
Lithuania  4,960  9,146 
Poland  55,268  47,040 
Romania  12,815  11,198 
Slovak Republic  11,864  10,868 
Slovenia  4,446  10,747 
        Source: 
        Penn World Table 6.2 by Heston, Summers and Aten (Sept. 2006). 
        UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database (downloaded on Nov. 3rd, 2006). 
              Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006).  14 
  Outward FDI data from U.S. surveys provide the fullest information on what foreign 
affiliates actually do, but the CEE countries have never been a major destination for U.S. 
investment.  In 2003, they accounted for about 2.7  percent of the employment in U.S. affiliates, 
0.4  percent of assets, and 1.5  percent of net property, plant, and equipment (US, BEA Web 
site).   What we can see from the data that do exist, dominated by the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland, is that for U.S. multinationals, the attraction of these countries is for labor-intensive 
activities.  The average assets per worker of U.S. affiliates in the CEE countries in 2003 were 
around $150,000, lower than the ratio in Latin America, at a little over $200 thousand, and much 
lower than that in Developing Asia, at about $430 thousand.  The average for affiliates in the 
pre-1995 EU was around $1.3 million (Table 4).  The U.S. investments were concentrated in 
manufacturing and, within manufacturing, in Transport equipment, plus, Electrical machinery in 
Hungary and Foods in Poland (Mataloni, 2005). 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of U.S. FDI in CEE Countries and Other Locations, 2003 
[Millions of USD]  





Relative to Sales 
World  0.035  0.893  0.102 
EU-15  0.050  1.295  0.125 
China  0.008  0.131  0.057 
Latin America  0.016  0.207  0.096 
Developing Asia
1  0.016  0.431  0.056 
CEE
2   0.013  0.148  0.081 
Bulgaria  0.007  0.059  0.142 
Czech Republic  0.012  0.148  0.083 
Estonia  0.011  0.098  0.101 
Hungary  0.015  0.178  0.075 
Latvia  0.018  0.263  0.060 
Lithuania  0.015  0.127  0.111 
Poland  0.014  0.162  0.081 
Romania  0.007  0.066  0.083 
Slovak Republic  0.013  0.107  0.086 
Slovenia  0.020  0.187  0.126 
  Note: 
1.  Asia and Pacific, except Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. 
2.  For employment data, if an interval is given in the source, the midpoint is used for calculation. 
 
  Source:  BEA Website    15 
  For Germany, in contrast to the United States, the CEE countries were a major location 
for FDI.  In 2004, they accounted for over 16 percent of the employment in German firms’ 
affiliates, but for only 3 percent of assets.  That large difference reflects the low capital intensity 
of these investments.  The average assets per employee in 2003, 1.2 million euros worldwide, 1.5 
million euros in the United States, and 1.8 million Euros in the 15 pre-1995 EU area, were only 
about 200 thousand euros in the CEE countries as a group.  That was above the 170 thousand 
levels in Latin American affiliates and the 160 thousand in China, but far below that in Other 
Developing Asia, at over 600,000 euros (Table 5).  
 
                     Note: 
1. Asia and Pacific, except Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. 
2. For employment data, if an interval is given, the average is used for calculation. 
 
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) 
    
  German manufacturing investment in the CEE countries was remarkably concentrated in 
Motor vehicles, even in 1992-94, in the two countries for which we have data by industry (Table 
6).  By 2002-2004, the concentration in that industry had increased, and was quite general across 
the CEE countries.   By then, two thirds of the German investment was in Motor vehicles and it 
Table 5: Total Assets Per Employee of German FDI in CEE 
Countries and Other Locations, 2003 [Millions of USD]  
   Total Assets Per Employee 
World  1.209 
EU-15  1.814 
China  0.161 
Latin America  0.168 
Developing Asia
1  0.635 
CEE
2   0.207 
Bulgaria  0.134 
Czech Republic  0.222 
Estonia  0.113 
Hungary  0.259 
Latvia  0.090 
Lithuania  0.106 
Poland  0.226 
Romania  0.054 
Slovak Republic  0.163 
Slovenia  0.213   16 
was the leading industry group for German FDI in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia.  Romania was the exception, with Electrical machinery the leading sector, followed by 
Motor vehicles, Chemicals, and Non-electrical machinery.  
 
Table 6: Industry Distribution of German Direct Investment In Manufacturing In CEE Countries, 1991-2004 
[%] 
   
Total 
CEE  Poland  Slovakia  Czech Republic  Hungary  Romania 
1992 -1994             
  Chemicals        7  12   
  Non-Electrical Machinery & Equip.        15  12   
  Electrical Machinery        18  11   
  Motor Vehicles        60  45   
               
2002-2004             
  Chemicals  10  24  6  7  6  21 
  Non-Electrical Machinery & Equip.  10  13  16  9  8  21 
  Electrical Machinery  12  11  3  20  7  31 
   Motor Vehicles  68  53  74  64  78  27 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1997) and (2006).   
 
  One probable result of the industry concentration of German FDI in these countries can 
be seen in the changes that took place in the revealed export comparative advantages of the 
countries.  In 9 of the 11 countries during the 1990s, the comparative advantage in Machinery 
and transport equipment increased or the comparative disadvantage decreased.   
  A few observations are suggested by the aggregate inflows from balance of payments 
data.  One is that there was a clear positive relationship between countries’ average governance 
scores and per capita FDI inflows over the 1990s.  Bulgaria and Romania had the lowest 
governance scores and the lowest inflows of FDI per capita. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Estonia had the highest governance scores and the highest inflows per capita.  The main outlier 
was Slovenia, with the highest governance score but only average FDI inflows per capita.    17 
Governance scores did not have as clear a relation to the ratio of inflows to nominal GDP, 
although the relationship was mostly positive, except again for the Slovenia outlier.   
      
Studies Based on Firm and Industry Data 
  There have been quite a few studies based on firm microdata of FDI in the CEE 
countries.  The periods covered are usually short for observing the effects of foreign ownership, 
some of which may require a long-term perspective. 
  All the CEE countries have received some attention, but the more important FDI 
destinations have received more attention than the smaller ones.  An impressive degree of care 
has been given to problems of dealing with short panels, unbalanced panels, endogeneity, the 
clustering of observations and its effect on measures of standard errors, and different ways of 
dealing with panel data.  Studies have examined effects of foreign investment on the recipient 
firm, spillovers of productivity to indigenous firms, and the entry and exit of indigenous firms. 
  These studies find most definitively that foreign participation increases the productivity 
of the affiliate itself (for example, Evenett and Voicu (2001) for the Czech Republic, Hannula 
and Tamm, 2002, for Estonia, Damijan, Knell, Majcen, and Rojec, 2003, for 10 countries).   In a 
study concerned with the effects of privatization in two CEE countries(Hungary and Romania) 
and Russia and Ukraine, Brown, Earle, and Telegdy found that privatizations to foreigners led to 
growth in the privatized firms’ total wage bills.  In the two CEE countries, the growth consisted 
of both increases in employment and increases in average wage levels.  The wage gains reflected 
gains in productivity in these privatizations.   
There is weaker and more complex evidence from the same studies for intra-industry 
productivity spillovers from foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms.  As usual,   18 
characteristics of the foreign and host-country firms and industries are significant determinants 
of spillovers.  Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003) found evidence for intra-industry spillovers from 
wholly-owned foreign firms, but not joint ventures, in Romania. In another study of Romania, 
Altomonte and Pennings (2005) found positive intra-industry effects on domestic firms’ 
productivity from initial foreign investments in an industry and region, but weaker effects and 
eventually negative ones as the foreign share grew.    In a study mainly devoted to the question 
of  “crowding out” of domestically-owned firms by foreign-owned ones, Kosová (2005) found 
evidence of intra-industry technology spillovers in the Czech Republic.  She also found evidence 
that the entry of foreign-owned firms initially increased the exit rate of domestically-owned 
firms in the same industry, but that after the initial setback, higher growth of foreign-owned 
firms represented domestic demand creation that increased both the growth rates and the survival 
of domestically-owned firms.    As in other host countries, indigenous firms that exported, 
performed R&D, and led their industries in productivity were more likely to gain from FDI.  
 Javorcik and Spatereanu (2003) found that joint ventures produced positive upstream 
spillovers to suppliers, while wholly-owned foreign firms produced negative upstream spillovers, 
probably because joint ventures tended to continue long-standing relationships with suppliers 
while wholly-owned foreign firms, using more advanced technology, require more sophisticated 
suppliers from abroad.  It might also be, although that is not suggested by the authors, that 
wholly-owned firms are more likely to be part of multinationals’ internal supply chains and 
therefore more likely to depend on associated firms in other countries for intermediate products, 
although that may not be an important aspect of supplier choices for affiliates in the CEE 
countries.  An earlier paper by Javorcik (2004), this one for Lithuania, had also found evidence   19 
of spillovers to upstream industries but not intra-industry, and also, as in the Romanian study, for 
joint ventures but not for firms that were wholly foreign-owned.   
There have been quite a few recent studies attempting to explain what attracts FDI, or 
particularly, German FDI to the CEE countries.  A paper by Bellak and Leibnecht (2005) studied 
FDI inflows into eight CEE countries from seven home countries, arguing that for those 
countries, FDI flows are “…a reasonable proxy of the annual change in property, plant, and 
equipment…” (p. 8).  Since six of the seven home countries are in Europe, the coefficient of the 
distance variable, sometimes significant and sometimes not, may be strongly influenced by U.S. 
investment flows.  As expected, host country size was positively related to the inflow and the 
actual, rather than the statutory, bilateral tax rate was negatively related.  Another paper using 
balance of payments measures, in this case the inward FDI stock, but including also the countries 
of the former Soviet Union, Kinoshita and Campos (2003), referred to these as forming “a 
unique situation akin to a natural experiment…” (p.1).  Since the data were not bilateral, distance 
was measured from Brussels for all host countries.  The results pointed to institutions, 
specifically rule of law and quality of bureaucracy, low labor costs, trade openness, progress 
towards economic reform, and past FDI, interpreted as agglomeration advantages.  No tax 
variable was included.  
Another gravity model paper, Borrmann, Jungnickel, and Keller (2005) explained 
German FDI production, rather than bilateral financial flows, but with no tax variable.  It found 
that German FDI production in “core” CEE countries already exceeded “normal” levels in 2001, 
but was reluctant to describe this high level as “overshooting” that would imply future reductions 
or even a slowing of growth.    20 
Although German affiliates in the CEE countries are clearly more labor intensive than 
those in the rest of Europe, Buch and Kleinert (2006) find that market access, and not only low 
production cost, is a major incentive to invest in the CEE countries.  Low parent labor intensity 
is associated with outward FDI in general, in the West as well as in the East. 
The issue of what determines the choice of locations among the CEE countries is less 
important for political and policy discussions in home countries than the choice between home 
production in Germany and production in the CEE countries.  Becker and Mündler (2006) 
calculate the effects of changes in wages in Germany and in the CEE countries on the allocation 
of employment by German multinational firms.   The effects are on the establishment of new 
foreign locations, the locations of which then tend to be stable, and on the allocation of jobs 
between home and existing foreign locations.  They find significant effects on a firm’s location 
of employment from wage changes both at home and abroad, which they describe as “…a salient 
impact on multinational labor substitution…” (p. 44). 
The omission of tax rates from many studies was something of a surprise.  However, in 
response to a call for papers for a workshop on studies of FDI based on microdata, we received 
many proposals for papers dealing with the influence of tax rates, including proposals dealing 
with European FDI.  That seems to suggest that the issue is becoming more important for 
European countries.  
Despite my belief that microdata are the road to progress in understanding FDI, there are 
some general issues that I think should be kept in mind. 
One issue in studies comparing domestically-owned and foreign-owned plants or firms is 
whether the differences that are observed are the consequence of foreign ownership, with its 
accompanying superior technology and efficiency, or are only the result of differences in the size   21 
of plants, their use of intermediate inputs, their dependence on imported intermediate inputs, 
their capital intensity, or other measurable differences in their structure.  If all these differences 
are taken into account, it is presumably possible to know, provided that there is substantial 
overlap between domestic and foreign plants in their characteristics, and that they are producing 
the same goods or services, of the same quality, whether foreign- owned and domestically-
owned plants produce on different production functions.    
My impression is that usually these conditions are not met.  Industrial data rarely are 
detailed enough to permit comparisons of quality, domestically-owned plants are usually much 
smaller on average than foreign-owned plants (that is true in the United States as it is in 
developing countries), inputs of intermediate products are often proprietary and not available to 
domestically-owned firms, and the technology needed to operate a large plant may be 
unavailable to a domestic producer.  My conclusion is that we should not confine our interest to 
differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants that can be unequivocally 
attributed to foreignness.  We should study also differences that are associated with foreign 
ownership but cannot be attributed unequivocally to that foreign origin. 
Another general problem is how to draw conclusions about the economy as a whole from 
microdata.  For example, a finding that a rise in wages at home leads multinationals to substitute 
X jobs in its foreign affiliates for jobs at home tells us what will happen to that firm’s 
employment at home but does not tell us what the effect on aggregate home employment will be, 
if any, or whether the effect will be on home wages or the distribution of employment among 
firms or the composition of home production.  It is difficult to go from the effects on the firm, 
which are in the microdata set, to broader impacts that may be outside the data.  When a state or 
locality in the United States offers incentives to a large new foreign manufacturing operation, it   22 
may be hoping for, and/or fearing, impacts on agriculture and retail trade, as farm and retail 
workers shift to better paying manufacturing jobs, and on wages in these industries as well as in 
manufacturing.  There may also be impacts on local and state government budgets, as subsidy 
costs compete with traditional government activities, and changes in the population and labor 
force in response to the industrial changes.  It is a challenge to keep in mind, and preferably to 
explore, these broader consequences of industrial change. 
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